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Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a
single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for
conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.’s long-distance reverberation
postulate, Ramachandran’s remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and
Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states
are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures
are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious
brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would
reﬂect a higher level of neural processing, independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms.
Copyright © 2009 B. Dresp-Langley and J. Durup. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
1.Introduction
In the last twenty years, consciousness studies have produced
a considerable bulk of theoretical and experimental works
concerned with trying to answer two critical questions: (1) is
a scientiﬁcally operational deﬁnition of consciousness possi-
ble and (2) where and how is this phenomenon produced in
the brain? Being able to answer the second question entirely
depends on whether a valid answer to the ﬁrst one can
be given. Looking back on the various diﬀerent approaches
in this ﬁeld (e.g., [1–9]), neuroscientists are left with
the conclusion that a fully operational yet comprehensive
deﬁnition of the phenomenon still poses a fundamental
problem, as pointed out in one of the more recent theoretical
papers by Block [10], where the author argues for an
“abstract solution” to the “problem of consciousness.” Given
that phenomenal consciousness by far exceeds cognitive
accessibility and performance, its neural basis is not to be
identiﬁed with the neural basis of any particular cognitive
process taking place within consciousness, as Block [10]a n d
others have argued. The “hard problem of consciousness”
(e.g., [11–13]) or the seemingly insurmountable diﬃculty to
explain through which mechanisms the conscious I which
is experienced in terms of Id o , If e e l ,or Ia marises in
the brain has, indeed, remained an unresolved issue. In
this paper, we propose an abstract solution to this problem
by suggesting a biophysical model which dissociates the
particular cognitive processes which may take place within
consciousness, such as conscious perception, for example,
from the neural mechanisms that trigger, maintain, and
terminate a conscious state (Id o , If e e l , Ia m ) in the brain.
The functional assumptions of our model clarify how such
a particular brain state may arise from purely temporal
resonance of memory signals in neural circuits, and how
this may happen in the absence of any stimulus input,
attention, or perception associated with a speciﬁc conscious
behaviour.
1.1. Conscious Perception and Behaviour the Limiting Factor.
Theories of consciousness based on cognitive performance
or conscious (as opposed to non-conscious) perception
do not address the “hard problem of consciousness.” The
scienceofconsciousnesshasthusfarbeenreducedtolooking
for measures and neural correlates of consciousbehaviour
that reﬂects particular cognitive processes. These measures2 Neural Plasticity
and correlates (see, e.g., [14], for a review) are nothing
more than partial traces, found in speciﬁc behaviour like
guided attention, active conscious perception and report,
or conscious memory recall, of a far more complex and
intricate phenomenon. Myriad studies in which a particular
behaviour is investigated to understand consciousness have
been reported. Dehaene et al. [9], for example, approached
consciousness in terms of conscious report. These authors
suggest that a human subject is phenomenally conscious
when some critical event is reliably reported and argue that
consciousness may, therefore, be deﬁned in terms of “access
of information to conscious report.” Interestingly, such a
restriction of phenomenal consciousness to processes that
enable information to access a certain level of conscious
representation is grounded in Block’s earlier theory of what
he called “access consciousness” [5]. However, considering
conscious report of human observers as an indicator for
mechanisms which give access to consciousness leads to
severalcriticalquestions,whichremaintobeanswered.Does
information made accessible to conscious report correspond
to ongoing or past, to real or imagined events? Does the
consciousexperiencethatissubjecttoconsciousreportoccur
well before, immediately before, or during the report? How
long would the experience be expected to last afterwards?
In short, is studying conscious perception and attention
suﬃcient to understand the mechanisms that produce
consciousness in the brain?
The logic of scientiﬁc explanation requires that the
nature of the explanandum, or what is to be explained,
is adequately derived from the explanans,o re x p l a n a t i o n
given. Considering the case of studies focussed on conscious
perception, we have to bear in mind that any speciﬁc
consciously performed behaviour is no more than a par-
ticular expression of the explanandum (consciousness). It
neither occurs consistently nor systematically whenever the
individual is conscious. An explanans derived from such a
particular form of expression is adequate only with regard to
thespeciﬁcperceptualprocessstudied,notwithregardtothe
explanandum (consciousness) as such. Speciﬁc behaviour
of conscious perception and conscious report and memory
recall has been correlated with speciﬁc neural activities in
the occipital and the late parieto-frontal regions of the brain
(see [15, 16]o r[ 9] for extensive reviews and discussions).
Along the same line of reasoning, these brain activities
may be interpreted adequately in terms of correlates of a
particular process of conscious behaviour highlighted by the
experimental data, but not in terms of the neural correlates
o fc o n s c i o u s n e s sa ss u c h .
Studies of behaviour which reﬂects what appear to be
transitions between nonconscious and conscious processes
such as change blindness (e.g., [17]) have given rise to
interpretationsofconsciousperceptionintermsofaselective
process which opens access to higher levels of information
processing. In change blindness, human observers are unable
todetectimportantchangesinbrieﬂypresentedvisualscenes
disrupted by blinks, ﬂashes, or other visual masks just before
the changes occur. This phenomenon may be seen as a
particular kind of preconscious perception ([1, 18]). In
fact, what happens in change blindness is that observers
fail to report what they actually see because they believe
that what is there is what they have seen just before. Such
belief blocks the selective process which would otherwise
enable the new information contained in the new visual
scene to access conscious perception. Change blindness
has been considered to result from top-down inhibition
of ongoing stimuli (cf. [18]), preventing their conscious
perception. Change blindness phenomena are particular
cases where the conscious state is ﬁlled with a dominant
memory representation of a previously experienced event.
This suggests that there is a selective brain mechanism
that makes information accessible to consciousness. More
importantly, such a selective mechanism may explain how
conscious states are generated in the complete absence of
awareness and perception, as in lucid dreaming, for example.
1.2.LucidDreamingandHallucinations:ConsciousExperience
without Perception. As pointed out already more than a cen-
tury ago by William James [11], consciousness encompasses
far more than being wakeful and able to consciously perceive
and remember events which occur or have occurred in the
world. When we dream intensely, we are not attentive to
stimuli, but we are phenomenally conscious. We may even
be able to access and report these phenomenal data several
hours later, when we recount our dreams over breakfast.
Similarly, patients suﬀering from mental disorders such as
schizophrenia experience hallucinatory events consciously in
the absence of external stimuli which trigger the experience.
How hallucinations may arise in the brain from hyper-
activation of volitional signals, triggering fully conscious and
often vivid visual imagery and internally generated “voices”
in hallucinating patients, has been discussed extensively by
[19] on the basis of his Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART),
t ow h i c hw ew i l lg e tb a c kl a t e r .
Baars (e.g., [20]) referred to phenomenal consciousness
as the “theatre of the mind,” which is reminiscent of writings
from the ﬁrst book (Part 4, Section 6) of the Treatise of
Human Nature (1740) in which the Scottish Philosopher
David Hume compared phenomenal consciousness to a
theatre with a scene of complex events where various
diﬀerent sensations make their successive appearance in the
course of time:
“The mind is a kind of theatre, where several
perceptions successively make their appearance; pass,
repass, glide away, and mingle in an inﬁnite variety
of postures and sensations. There is properly neither
simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in diﬀerent,
whatevernatural propension we may have to imagine
that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the
theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive
perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have
we the most distant notion of the places where these
scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it
is composed.”
Hume’s phenomenal description deﬁnes consciousness in
terms of successive moments in time where feelings and
sensations, not necessarily related to ongoing external events
or stimuli, appear and vanish from the mind.Neural Plasticity 3
LaBerge et al. ([21]) argue that dreaming of perceiving
and doing is equivalent to perceiving and doing. Such a
view is supported by evidence for a functional equivalence
of psycho-physiological correlates of consciousness in active
wakeful observers and during lucid dreaming, which occurs
inREMsleepphases.Luciddreamingandequivalentwakeful
activitiesaremeasuredintermsofrelativelyshortEEGsignal
epochsindicatingaspeciﬁcactivationlevelofthecentralner-
vous system (e.g., [22]). In addition, it has been shown (e.g.,
[23]) that the invariant patterns of change in quantitative
EEG analysis during anaesthesia and wakefulness are reliable
brain correlates of what we will refer to here as the conscious
brain state.
1.3. The Conscious Brain State. The notion of the conscious
state was discussed earlier by Tononi & Edelman [24]a n d
Edelman [25], based on a deﬁnition proposed by von der
Malsburg [26] in terms of a continuous brain process
with a limited duration. Such an abstract deﬁnition of
consciousness allows separating certain properties of the
physiologicalstateofthebrainduringaconsciousexperience
from the subjective phenomenal contents that are being
experienced. Moreover, it satisﬁes a major constraint to
the scientiﬁc study of consciousness, the so-called law of
parsimony (lex parsimoniae) .T h el a t t e ri sb o t he t h i c a l l y
and pragmatically grounded in the philosophy of science
of the English cleric William of Occam (14th century:
“entia non sunt multiplicanda necessitatem”) and states that
the explanation of a phenomenon should resort to as few
“entities” (mechanisms, processes, laws) as possible.
We argue that the deﬁnition of a conscious state of the
brain, in which Ia m , Id o ,or If e e l ,m o s ta d e q u a t e l yd e ﬁ n e s
a scientiﬁcally operational explanandum. This latter is then
to be accounted for by an explanans in terms of the fewest
mechanisms needed for its generation. Conscious states are
neither identical nor reducible to states of awareness or
vigilance (see also [27]). Particular cognitive processes such
as conscious memory recall, attention, conscious perception,
and volition ([9, 19, 28–31]) may or may not be part of
the expression of a conscious state at a given moment in
time. A conscious state is a speciﬁc functional state of the
brain, one that enables conscious experience of various
subjective contents but is functionally independent from
these subjective contents. In a conscious state where I feel
that Ia mt i r e d , for example, the brain substrate for the
conscious nature of this feeling is functionally independent
from the brain signals produced by my physiological and
psychological states (tired) at that given moment. How the
temporal signatures that generate conscious states become
progressively independent from brain signals involved in
particular sensorial and perceptual processes in the course of
development will be discussed later.
John [32] argued that the most probable invariant level
of neural activity or coherent functional interaction among
brain regions that can be measured when a person is in a
conscious state is the best possible approximation to what
he called the “conscious ground state of the brain.” The
conscious ground state of the brain results from speciﬁc
activities in neural circuits with no more than two (see
also [25]) general functional characteristics: (1) very limited
information processing capacity (see, e.g., [33–35]) and (2)
a unique representational content for a limited and relatively
short duration (e.g., [8, 36–38]). The database from which a
conscious state draws this representational content is steadily
updated through nonconscious processes, which constitute
by far the largest part of all brain activity (e.g., [39–41]).
Conscious information processing involves very little of such
activity. It has been argued that this functional constraint is
the limiting factor to any theory of consciousness ([25, 42–
44]). Conscious information processing relies on serial pro-
cessing and allows for only a limited amount of information
to be dealt with in the time span of a given conscious state.
This is reﬂected, for example, by the fact that most people
cannot consciously follow two ideas at the same time, or
consciously execute two tasks simultaneously (e.g., [45, 46]).
Thus, it seems quite clear that the conscious brain state relies
entirely on working memory capacity ([47–50]).
2. Time-Bin Model for Conscious State
GenerationintheBrain
T h em o d e lw ep r o p o s eh e r ei sb a s e do nt h ei d e at h a ta
conscious brain state is generated on the basis of purely
temporal coincidences of memory signals, sometimes called
representations, deﬁned as by Churchland ([51, Page 64])
in terms of “patterns of activity across groups of neurons
which carry information.” Such patterns of neural activity
are described by unique signal sequences across time. These
constitute the potential temporal signatures of conscious
states.
2.1. The Temporal Signatures of Conscious Brain States.
Earlier models based on the functional properties of working
memory have attempted to clarify how groups of neurons
could produce a speciﬁc temporal signal sequence, or
temporal signature, that is suﬃcient to activate, maintain,
and terminate a conscious state in the brain. Such a temporal
signature would fulﬁl a double function: it would enable the
generation of speciﬁc conscious brain states that are well
distinguished from non-conscious brain states, and it would
provide ready accounts for both their selective nature and
the fact that they may occur in the mind more than once. A
certain class of theoretical approaches to working memory,
such as the Lisman-Idiart-Jensen memory model ([52–57])
has proposed temporal mechanisms based on some of the
empirical ﬁndings summarized above, postulating a working
memory with a maximum processing capacity of only a few
items, where each such item is represented by the ﬁring
activity of a cell assembly, the so-called coding assembly,
in a well-deﬁned temporal window. Speciﬁc numerical
predictions were developed on the basis of such memory
models (for details, see [56, 58]). Bas ¸ar [59]a n dB a s ¸ar et
al. [60] considered cognitive transfer activities to be based
on oscillations at speciﬁc temporal frequencies, combined
like the letters of an alphabet to deliver a temporal code
for conscious brain activity measurable through wavelet
analysis of EEG or event-related potentials (ERPs). While
these numerical models illustrate both the plausibility and4 Neural Plasticity
the potential power of temporal codes in the brain, there
is a major diﬀerence between such models and the one
we propose here to account for conscious state generation.
Our hypothesis relies on particular dynamics of temporal
messages, or resonant time-bin messages, produced by a
complex system (the brain) within massively distributed
circuits of neurons. It implies that these temporal dynamics
are oscillatory, since all known resonance mechanisms are
by their physical nature oscillatory, but does not make
predictionsregardinganyparticularfrequencybands.Recent
models’ simulations have invoked possible cortical con-
straints for the genesis of particular conscious perceptual
events, requiring a synchronization of oscillations in visual
cortical and prefrontal areas ([61]) for example. Our own
modelpostulates afunctionalseparationbetween perception
related neural activities in functionally identiﬁed cortical
regions and the temporal neural activity patterns which
generateconsciousstatesandreﬂectahigherprocessinglevel.
Synchronizationofneuralactivitiesgeneratedinthediﬀerent
functionally identiﬁed areas of the brain is not required to
enable such processing.
Taking the general idea of temporal codes in the brain
further, we argue that unique combinations of temporal
sequences beyond some critical activity threshold generate
unique conscious states, whichmay be regenerated whenever
that signature is retrieved again, either by the same set of
neurons or any other set capable of producing it. Such
neural timing for conscious state generation would rely
on simultaneous supra threshold activation of sets of cells
within dedicated neural circuits in various arbitrarily but
not necessarily randomly determined loci of the brain. The
intrinsictopologythatdetermineswhichsinglecellofagiven
circuit produces which spike pattern of a given temporal
signature is, therefore, independent of the topological func-
tional organization of the brain.
This assumption that a conscious brain state is triggered
by temporal signals of neural circuits that operate at a
higher level and independently from other functionally
speciﬁc circuitry suggests a way of thinking that is radically
diﬀerent from that oﬀered by most current approaches. Such
functional independence has the considerable advantage
that, should subsets of coding cells be destroyed, other
subsets could still deliver the temporal code for conscious
states elsewhere in the brain. This hypothesis is fully justiﬁed
in the light of evidence for a considerable plasticity of
functional brain organization (e.g., [62]), which we will
discuss later herein in greater detail.
2.2. Temporal Limits of the Conscious Brain State. Just as
the temporal signal sequence or activity pattern of any
single coding cell is determined by its ﬁring activity across
a certain length of time, the temporal signature of a
conscious state is also linked to duration, with variations
in the limited dynamic range of a few hundreds of mil-
liseconds. These temporal limitations have led many authors
to link a conscious brain state to a speciﬁc conscious
experience, or “psychological moment” ([24, 63, 64]) the
particular expressions of which have been investigated in
neurobiological and psychophysical studies (e.g., [64–81]).
Neural network simulations matching the psychophysical
and neurobiological data have been proposed ([31, 82]).
Here, for important theoretical reasons stated in the
introduction, we attempt to go beyond explanations which
link the conscious state to any speciﬁc conscious content or
experience, bearing in mind that our model is to suggest
an “abstract solution” to the problem of consciousness (cf.
[10]). Such an abstract solution could be, we argue, a purely
temporal pattern code underlying the genesis of conscious
states in the brain. To decipher such a code in neural signal
patterns, the biophysical duration t of a conscious state may
be divided into time bins [83], the duration of which is lim-
ited by the accuracy of neuronal timing, or the lower limit of
biophysics.Eachsuchbinisexpressedthroughtheparameter
Δt, which represents the sum of standard deviations for the
timedelayofsynaptictransmissionincludingthedurationof
the refractory period. An average estimate of 6milliseconds
for Δt appears reasonable in the light of currently available
data, which give estimates between 3 and 10ms for this
parameter ([84–89]). Interspike intervals and integration
times of cortical neurons display a similar dynamic range
[90]. Under the simple assumption that within each time bin
there is either a signal or no signal, which is derived from
McCullough & Pitts’ [91] germinal work on information
transmission in neural networks, the information content
of a bin with a signal is 1bit. On the basis of an average
duration t of 300milliseconds for the conscious state, a Δt
of 6milliseconds for each bin, the information content of a
consciousbrainstatewithaveragedurationwouldnotexceed
300/6 = 50bits. A similar computation of the maximum
quantity of information conveyed by a duration t with
a number of temporal windows identiﬁed by a given Δt
was proposed by MacKay & McCulloch [92]. Other time-
based models of biophysical information processing related
to conscious brain states were suggested later by Thorpe
et al. [93] and VanRullen et al. [94]. Approaches in terms of
dynamic analyses of correlated oscillations in cortical areas
at various frequencies (e.g., [95]) and functional interactions
between gamma and theta oscillations in diﬀerent structures
of the brain (e.g., [96]) are consistent with biophysical
time estimates given previously. How an immense variety
of neural signals would be processed to generate a purely
temporal code for conscious brain states becomes clearer
in the light of functional properties of reverberant neural
circuits in the brain, and the concept of a functional
separation between spatial and temporal neural messages in
the course of long-distance signal propagation.
2.3. Long-Distance Signal Propagation and Functional Segre-
gationofSignalContents. Reverberantcircuitsorloopsinthe
brain have their own intrinsic toplogy (e.g. [9, 31, 97–101]).
Reverberant neural activity has been found in thalamo-
cortical ([102–104]) as well as in cortico-cortical pathways
([105–108] ) .R e v e r b e r a n tn e u r a la c t i v i t ya ss u c hi sap u r e l y
temporal process that generates feed-back loops in the brain,
referred to by some as “re-entrant circuits” ([24, 25, 98, 109–
117]). Reverberation is an important functional property
of the brain because without it, the conscious execution of
focussed action would be diﬃcult, if not impossible [108].Neural Plasticity 5
Dehaene et al. [9] suggested that consciousness relies on
the extension of local brain activation to higher association
cortices that are interconnected by long-distance connec-
tions forming reverberating neuronal circuits extending
across distant perceptual areas. We believe that the major
functional advantage of such long-distance reverberation
could be that it allows holding information online for
durations that are unrelated to the duration of a given
stimulus and long enough to enable the rapid propagation
of information through diﬀerent brain systems. Functional
imaging studies have associated conscious brain activity
with the parieto-frontal pathways, others suggested occipital
correlates (see [16], for an extensive review). What both
these brain regions have in common, interestingly, is that
they are protected from ﬂuctuations in sensory signals
and therefore allow information sharing across a broad
variety of higher cognitive processes, well beyond sensory
perception.
We argue that such selective information sharing and
reduction of signal variations would provide an important
functional advantage to the systems in the brain which
produce the conscious state code, because at such a stage
of processing, such systems would be no longer required to
sort out highly complex cross-talk between signals from a
multitude of diﬀerent channels. Thus, the major functional
hypothesis of our model claims that long-distance reverber-
ation of neural signals across long-range connections enables
functional segregation of spatial and temporal message con-
tents of reverberating signals. Such a decoupling of temporal
from spatial messages clariﬁes how a stable and precise brain
code for conscious states can be generated despite the highly
plastic and largely diﬀuse spatial functional organization
of the brain. A candidate mechanism underlying such a
decoupling of neural message contents is signal decorrela-
tion, which has become an important concept in neural
network theory and systems theory in general. Decorrelation
reduces cross-talk between multichannel signals in complex
systems such as the brain while preserving other critical
signal properties. On the basis of this general assump-
tion, the following postulates and model properties are
stated.
(1) Only non-conscious brain processes have enough
capacity to process the complex cross-talk between
spatial and temporal signals originating from various
simultaneously activated and functionally speciﬁc
sensory areas.
(2) The temporal signatures of conscious states are
generated and consolidated in reverberating inter-
connected neural circuits that extend across long
distances well beyond functionally speciﬁc topology
(3) The activation of a temporal signature generating
a conscious state depends on statistical temporal
coincidence of neural activity patterns (memory
representations).
(4) This temporal signature is independent of signal
contents or messages relative to spatial brain maps.
The circuitry generating a temporal signature would have
an intrinsic and essentially arbitrary but not necessarily
random topology in terms of “which cell ﬁres ﬁrst.”
This intrinsic topology is solely determined by temporal
resonance principles. While there is no empirically based
description of resonators receiving, amplifying, and trans-
mittingtime-patternedmessagesinthebrain,alargenumber
of physical and biophysical phenomena can be plausibly
and parsimoniously explained on the basis of resonance
principles or mechanisms, as the ART simulations cited here
have successfully shown. Grossberg (e.g. [31]) often invokes
evolutionary pressure to explain why resonant brain codes
are, indeed, likely. Here, we propose to go one step further
by claiming that it is likely that evolution has produced
brains capable of generating conscious states on the basis
of resonant dynamics of a higher and more abstract order
compared with the original resonant code of ART.
2.4. Functional Characteristics of the Time-Bin Model. It is
likely that biological resonators, in contrast with “ordinary”
resonance devices designed by humans, would have highly
sophisticated operating principles, given that hundreds of
functionally diﬀerent kinds of cells exist in the brain. On
the other hand, there is no reason why resonators in
the brain would have to function with a high level of
precision, provided that they operate according to some
redundancy principle and the whole group of resonating
cells producing a conscious state behaves in a statistically
predictable way. Our model conception of temporal signal
sequences forming a speciﬁc biophysical time-bin pattern
that activates, maintains, and inactivates a conscious state
is certainly and inevitably a simpliﬁcation of reality. Such
a simpliﬁcation does not aﬀect the internal validity of the
model arguments stated. Their major goal is to explain how
a brain system could generate conscious states through the
least costly processes, on the basis of a relatively limited
amount of neural resources.
Given the known temporal properties of conscious
information processing, we suppose that conscious states
may generate messages corresponding to a vast number of
variable contents translated in terms of bit sequences. In the
simplest possible model, any of these conscious states would
be identiﬁed by a unique sequence of 1second and 0second.
Thus, in the same way as bar codes provide the key to an
almost inﬁnite variety of things, these temporal sequences
provide the key to conscious brain states. A given temporal
codewouldbegeneratedspontaneouslyatagivenmomentin
early brain development then eventually be reproduced and
consolidated during brain learning. Consolidation would be
aresultofrepeatedreverberationincorticalmemorycircuits,
leading to speciﬁc resonance states which correspond to
conscious states. Once a resonance circuit is formed, it is
able to generate a conscious state at any given moment in
time provided there is a statistically signiﬁcant temporal
coincidence between brain activity patterns, or memory
representations. As long as this threshold of statistically
signiﬁcant coincidence is not attained, these memory repre-
sentations in the resonant circuitry remain non-conscious or
preconscious.6 Neural Plasticity
Counting from a ﬁrst signal or spike in biophysical
time, a temporal sequence of 1second and 0second may
be described as a succession of intervals between 1’s. Let
us imagine a network of brain cells, or resonator, with
a functional architecture or connectivity described by the
shapes of closed polygons (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
Each apex of such a polygon would correspond to a neuron
which can receive input and emit output signals from and to
processors anywhere in the brain, including along particular
tracks of a resonant circuit primed for a particular temporal
signature during development. Here, we refer to the apices
of such a network model in terms of dedicated principal
resonant neurons (PRNs). PRNs would be part of intra- and
intercortical networks of neurons, capable of forming long-
range connections with other neurons across large distances
acrossthebrain,wellbeyondtheirnearestneighbours,asone
of their major functional property. Not all neurons in the
brain would have such a capacity.
Each edge of a polygon would represent a delay path
which transmits signals from a given apex to the next, with
a characteristic delay corresponding to some multiple of
the elementary “bin” unit (Δt, as deﬁned earlier by others
in other models discussed earlier here). The distribution
of these delays should ﬁt the proportion of 1’s and 0’s in
typical “time-bin” messages: if, for example, 1’s are as likely
to occur in a code as 0’s, then the proportions of various
delays Δt,2Δt,...,nΔt would be predictable. The delay paths
as such would correspond to local neural architectures in
thebrain(e.g.[119–124]).Whatevertheeﬀectiveoperational
structure of such a resonance circuit, the speciﬁc temporal
signatures it generates would be experience dependent and
consolidated during development. The database of long-
term memory representations from which these temporal
signatures are drawn is updated continuously through non-
conscious mechanisms. The conscious experience of an
event we perceive as “new” is generated by a temporal
resonancepattern thatis forthe ﬁrst time activatedabove the
coincidencethreshold.Suchapatternisbuiltfromanewand
unique combination of previously non-conscious memory
representations.
All PRNs would have been primed during brain devel-
opment to send signals along all delay paths originating
from them, and all those receiving a signal coinciding with
the next input signal would remain activated. Connections
between PRNs would thereby be potentiated, as in the
classical Hebbian model. Simultaneously, signals travelling
from initially activated neurons to connected cells with too
long delay paths would be cancelled. Thus, once a given
polygon of the resonant network is potentiated along all of
its edges, it would reverberate temporally coinciding signals
while amplifying resonant connections across populations
of resonant neurons within massively parallel neural net-
works in the brain. This model assumption is biologically
plausible in the light of physiological evidence for both
intra- and intercortical connectivity across large distances
in the primate brain. The representational power of this
distributed temporal code, after functional decoupling from
all spatial signal contents relating to functionally speciﬁed
cortical topology, is virtually unlimited. Such a code does
not imply an identity link between the spatial patterns
describing a subset of PRNs (Figure 1(b)) and the temporal
ﬁring sequence recorded at any such PRN, nor is there any
reason why it should. Whether the nine resonant activity
patterns shown in Figure 2(b) will trigger given conscious
state is not determined by the spatial activity distribution as
such, but by the relative probabilistic weight or, expressed
in computational language, the relative synaptic weights of
the connections of a given subset of PRNs within large
populations of such neurons. Thus, any of the nine diﬀer-
ent resonant states represented in Figure 2(b) would only
generate a conscious state if the temporal sequence shown
produces resonant activity above the statistical probability
threshold. The biological plausibility of a probabilistically
driven temporal code relies on the fact that, in the outside
world, some physical events are more likely than others. We
may consistently assume that brain events would likewise be
governed by probabilistic principles.
Probabilistic mechanisms ensure both the relative
uniqueness and the seriality of conscious brain events
in a competitive race of massively distributed temporal
resonances where the winner takes all. How neuronal
circuitslearnstatisticalinformationembeddedindistributed
patterns of activity is shown in some of the ART simulations
by Grossberg et al. (cf. [82]). Brain learning based on purely
temporal signal statistics is simulated in the TEMPOTRON
model [118].
2.5.FromElementaryTemporalActivityPatternstoaDynamic
Resonant Code. Like time-bin resonance itself, the selection
of the critical temporal ﬁring patterns that constitute the
access code for conscious states would use purely statistical
criteria, leading to fewer and fewer consolidated patterns
for increasingly complex signal coincidences as the brain
learns and develops. When we are born, all brain activity
is more or less arbitrary, not necessarily random. During
brain development, temporal activity patterns elicited by
events in biophysical time will be linked to a variety of
particular conscious experiences in a decreasingly arbitrary
manner as frequently occurring codes are progressively
consolidated through a process which we propose to call
developmental selection. This is illustrated in Figure 2,
which is our adaptation of Figure 6 from Helekar’s [88]
paper. Developmental selection resolves a critical problem in
Helekar’s theory, which fails to explain how a nonarbitrary
linkage of the code to a variety of contents may take place.
To overcome this dilemma, Helekar daringly proposed
a genetically determined linkage, which ﬂies into the face
of a large body of evidence showing that brain processes
are highly plastic and experience dependent. A genetically
determined linkage of the immense variety of possible
subjective experience and speciﬁc temporal brain activities
leaves the question of a brain mechanism for conscious
states unanswered. Helekar’s “elementary experience-coding
temporal activity patterns” are conceived in terms of pre-
programmed subsets of neural ﬁring patterns belonging
to the set of all possible temporal patterns that could
be generated by the brain. His original hypothesis stated
that only those patterns that are members of this subsetNeural Plasticity 7
(a) (b)
Figure 1:Genesisofresonancestatesinadedicatedcircuitwithﬁveprincipalresonantneuronsactingas“coincidencedetectors.”Figure 1(a)
illustrates a dedicated resonant circuit with ﬁve principal resonant neurons acting as coincidence detectors. Each apex of a given polygon
corresponds to a principal resonant neuron which can receive input or emit output signals from and to processors anywhere in the brain,
along the long-distance tracks of resonant circuitry that has been primed in the course of brain development to generate the temporal
activity patterns for conscious state generation. Unidirectional priming only is shown here as one possible example, for illustration. Each
edge of a polygon represents a delay path which transmits signals from a given apex to the next, with a characteristic delay that would
correspond to some multiple of the elementary “bin” unit. All principal resonant neurons would have been primed throughout lifespan
brain development to preferentially process input which carries statistically “strong” signals. When activated, principal resonant neurons
send signals along all delay paths originating from them, and all those receiving a signal coinciding with the next input signal remain
activated. The connections between principal resonant neurons of suc ham o d e lw o u l dt h u sb ep o t e n t i a t e da si nt h ec l a s s i cH e b b i a nm o d e l .
Figure 1(b) shows some of the many possible excitation patterns within a dedicated resonance circuit with only ﬁve principal neurons. Such
circuitswouldforminterconnectedneuralnetworksthatextendacrosslargedistancesacrossthebrainandhaveintrinsic,essentiallyarbitrary
though not random, topologies in terms of “which cell ﬁres ﬁrst.” Such intrinsic topology is unrelated to functionally speciﬁc spatial cortical
maps. As in the world some events are more likely than others, the same holds for brain events. Whether a given temporal resonance pattern
will or will not generate a conscious state is determined by statistical likelihood computations in the brain. How such computations may
work is simulated in ART (e.g., [82]), or the TEMPOTRON model by Gutig & Sompolinski [118].
would give rise to conscious experiences upon their repeated
occurrence. The repeated occurrence of ordinary patterns,
which Helekar calls noncoding patterns, would not produce
conscious experience. The problem with such reasoning is
that, once again, the subjective contents of a conscious state
are identiﬁed with the functional nature of the state as such.
In contrast to such a view, we claim that what is commonly
called a “subjective experience” is encoded and decoded in
the brain through non-conscious mechanisms only.
Also, rather than invoking a genetic programme, we
prefer the far more likely hypothesis of a progressively
nonarbitrary linkage of potential contents of conscious states
and their temporal signatures on the basis of developmental
processes and brain learning. Once a given temporal sig-
nature has been arbitrarily linked to a conscious state, it
remainspotentiallyavailableasa“brainhypothesis,”whichis
then either progressively consolidated, or not. Once consol-
idated, linkages between code and content may become less
arbitrary, in some cases even deterministic. The progressive
consolidation of linkages between code and content happens
outside consciousness, through the repeated matching of
working memory representations to long-term memory
representations,aspostulatedinGrossberg’sART(e.g.,[31]).
2.6. From Temporal Resonance to Biophysical Eigenstates. As
pointed out above, what distinguishes a conscious state
from a non-conscious state solely depends on a statistical
threshold. A brain mechanism achieving coincidence com-
putation would lead to the activation of a speciﬁc temporal
code at a given time on the basis of statistically signiﬁcant
coincidences. A conscious state arises from a temporarily
activated temporal signature generated within reverberating
neural circuits extending across long distances in the brain.
What we call “experience” in common language is coded
in the brain in terms of signal sequences in biophysical
time. The statistical coincidence of speciﬁc temporal activity
patterns triggers, maintains, and terminates conscious brain
states like a bar code would activate, maintain, and inactivate
the electronic locks of a safe. Given the almost inﬁnite
number of signal sequences that are possible in a temporal8 Neural Plasticity
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Figure 2: Developmental selection of temporal activity patterns
coding for conscious state access. Figure 2 illustrates schematically
how the critical temporal activity patterns for conscious states
would be progressively selected through activity dependent plas-
ticity during lifespan brain development. At birth, a potentially
inﬁnite number of temporal activity patterns would be generated
more or less randomly in the neural circuits of the brain. As
brain learning progresses, repeated matches of brain events would
generate resonant states in long-distance neural circuits. Such
resonant states result from higher order processing in dedicated
resonant circuits which function independently from sensorial
and perceptual processes. Whenever the temporal ﬁring patterns
produced by these dedicated resonance circuits reach the statistical
temporalcoincidencethreshold,theygenerateaconsciousbrainstate.
Such a temporal code would unlock the door to consciousness like
some bar code would unlock the door of an electronically protected
safe.
code, there should be a unique temporal pattern for a unique
conscious state.
In terms of quantum physics analogy, our time-bin reso-
nancemodelsuggeststhatnon-consciousstatesaredescribed
by temporal wavefunctions which do not have a well-deﬁned
period. While a non-conscious state may be a combination
of many nonspeciﬁc eigenstates, resonant activity beyond
the probabilistic coincidence threshold would produce the
well-deﬁned temporal activity pattern, or wavefunction, of
a single speciﬁc eigenstate, the “conscious eigenstate.”
3. Arguments in Favour of the Temporal Code
T h ec o n c e p to fat e m p o r a ln e u r a lc o d ef o rc o n s c i o u ss t a t e s
as the most parsimonious link between brain and mind
is justiﬁed in the light of several theoretical arguments.
It might be useful here to recall that the term “code”
initially stems from information theory and may stand for
both (1) an entire system of information transmission or
communication (like the brain) where symbols are assigned
deﬁnite meanings and (2) a set of symbols for the content
of a given message (like a temporal activity pattern) within
t h a ts y s t e m .O n ea r g u m e n ti nf a v o u ro fap u r e l yt e m p o r a l
access code for conscious brain states is its undeniable func-
tional and adaptive advantage. Its origin would most likely
be epigenetic. During brain development, our subjective
experience remains largely non-conscious in the ﬁrst months
of our learning existence. Then, such experience eventually
generates data of our phenomenal consciousness, around the
age of two or three.
3.1. Plasticity of Spatial Functional Brain Organization.
Sensory, somatosensory, and proprioceptive signals may be
perceived instantly as data of a conscious state, eliciting
what psychophysicists call spontaneous sensations. The
integration of the variety of signals such sensations originate
from relies on non-conscious mechanisms, which have to be
suﬃciently adaptable and display a certain functional plas-
ticity to enable the continuous updating of representations
in response to changes imposed on our brains day by day
by new situations and experiences. Clinical observations in
neurological patients severely challenge the idea that any
function should be ﬁxed in speciﬁc loci. The “phantom limb”
syndrome (e.g., [125, 126]) is one such example revealing
the extraordinary plasticity of topological functional brain
organization. The phantom limb syndrome was already
mentioned in writings by Par´ e and Descartes, and described
in greater detail by Gu´ eniot [127]. It has been repeatedly
observed in hundreds of case studies since. After arm
amputation, patients often experience sensations of pain in
the limb that is no longer there, and experimental data show
that a third of such patients systematically refer stimulations
of the face to the phantom limb, with a topographically
organized map for the individual ﬁngers of a hand. On the
basis of similar evidence for massive changes in somatotopic
maps after digit amputation and other experimental data
showing that several years after dorsal rhizotomy in adult
monkeys, a region corresponding to the hand in the cortical
somatotopic map of the primate’s brain is activated by
stimuli delivered to the face [128], Ramachandran and
his colleagues proposed their “remapping hypothesis” (e.g.,
[129]). The latter clariﬁes how spatial and topological
representations are referred to other loci in the brain through
massive cortical reorganization. The ﬁndings reported by
Ramachandran and others provide compelling evidence
that, despite dramatic changes in non-conscious topology,
representations remain available to the conscious state and
can still be experienced as sensations of pain, cold, digging,
or rubbing. We believe that this is so because the higher level
temporal signatures of lower level sensory representations
persist for some time in the brain.
3.2. The Temporal “Coherence Index” and Coincidence Detec-
tion. In his “neurophysics of consciousness,” John [32, 130]Neural Plasticity 9
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Figure 3: The conscious eigenstate as a function of biophysical and subjectively recalled time. Figure 3 illustrates how a conscious eigenstate
of the brain may be conceived as part of a state vector as a function of biophysical time (T) and subjectively recalled time (τ). In our model,
the duration of a conscious eigenstate would correspond to a given number of biophysical “time bins.” Biophysical time (t) is independent of
the subjectively recalled duration of a given experience by a human individual and would correspond to the duration of the critical temporal
activity pattern generated in dedicated long-distance resonant circuits to activate, maintain, and inactivate a conscious eigenstate. Our “time
bin model” thus explains how the inner clocks of consciousness operate independently from subjective experience, where variations from
“interesting” to “dull” may produce variable, subjectively recalled durations of events.
suggested that a conscious state may be identiﬁed with a
brain state where information is represented by levels of
coherence among multiple brain regions, revealed through
coherent temporal ﬁring patterns that deviate signiﬁcantly
from random ﬂuctuations. This assumption is consistent
with the idea of a stable and perennial temporal code
for conscious state generation despite spatial remapping
or cortical reorganization. Empirical support for John’s
theory comes from evidence for a tight link between
electroencephalographicactivityinthegammarangedeﬁned
by temporal ﬁring rates between 40 and 80Hz (i.e., the
so-called “40-Hz” or “phase-locked” gamma oscillations)
and conscious states (e.g. [131]). This ”coherence index,”
with a characteristic phase locking at 40Hz, was found to
change with increasing sedation in anaesthesia, independent
of the type of anaesthetic used [132]. Decreasing temporal
frequencies were reported when doses of a given anaesthetic
were increased. Moreover, the characteristic phase locking
at 40Hz displays coherence not only across brain regions
during focussed arousal, but also during REM sleep when
thesubjectisdreaming([133]).Coherencedisappearsduring
dreamless, deep slow-wave sleep, which is consistent with
ﬁndings reported on deeply anesthetized patients. The fact
that the temporal coherence index of a conscious state is
producedduringfocussedarousalaswellasduringdreaming
in REM sleep phases is fully consistent with the LaBerge’s
idea (e.g. [21]) that dreams and conscious imagination
represent functionally equivalent conscious states. Phase-
locking at some critical temporal frequency may result from
intracortical reverberation and may correlate with the brain
mechanisms which establish arbitrary nonrandom depar-
turesfromdiﬀerentlociortopologicalmaps.Suchmapsmay
undergo functional re-organization. The temporal code for
conscious state generation, once established, would remain
intact for quite a while, keep resonating and eventually reach
the critical activation threshold.
3.3. Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART). Originally, Adaptive
Resonance Theory was conceived as a theory of brain
learning to explain how the brain generates and updates
representations of continuously changing physical environ-
ments ([134]). The theory was then extended to account
for related phenomena such as attention, intention, volition,
and the conscious perception of visual objects (e.g., [135])
or speech (e.g., [136]). Intentions and volition lead to
focus attention on potentially relevant internal or external
events. These foci of attention lead to new representations
when the brain is able to validate and integrate them into
resonant states, which would include the conscious states of
the brain. According to Grossberg [31], all conscious states10 Neural Plasticity
are resonant states, triggered by external or internal events
and mediated by attention or volition. ART successfully
explains how the brain ensures the continuous updating of
long-term memory representations through a mechanism
termed top-down matching, and how repeated top-down
matching can lead to resonant brain states. Since the brain is
continuously confronted with all sorts of old and new events,
it has to continuously generate probabilistic hypotheses to
determine what all these events are most likely to be, and
whether they are relevant. This involves matching working
memory representations to representations stored in long-
term memory. Coincidence of such bottom-up and top-
down representations produces so-called matching signals,
or coincidence signals which, when repeatedly generated,
lead to resonant states in the brain. These are, according
to Grossberg, topologically grounded in the “What” and
“Where” processing streams of the brain (see [31]f o ra n
e x t e n s i v er e v i e w ) .T h er e s o n a n tc o d es u g g e s t e di nA R Ti s
thus tightly linked to functionally speciﬁc brain regions
coding for perceptual and sensorial processes.
H e r ew ea r g u e ,f o rr e a s o n sw eh a v es p e c i ﬁ e da b o v e ,
that the generation of conscious brain states is largely
independent of these speciﬁc functions. It must therefore
dependonahigherorderand,aswesuggest,purelytemporal
code based on resonant brain activities beyond sensorial
or perceptual processes, most likely on the basis of long-
distance propagation and reverberation leading to such
higher level resonance. While perception and sensation may
be particular aspects of a speciﬁc conscious experience (see
above), the mechanisms underlying such experience are
not to be confounded with the mechanisms underlying the
conscious brain state as such. We suggest that the latter is
accounted for at the level of an “abstract” brain process, as
explained in the paragraphs dealing with the time bin model,
through a biophysical code in which a single dimension
(time) of neural processing is preserved. The temporal
signatures for conscious state generation may be seen as
an emergent property of such higher level resonant brain
dynamics, which would be functionally disconnected from
perceptual processes or sensations. When I fully experience
Ia m , as in deep meditation, I may not perceive visually,
hear sound, or experience any sensation other than total
relaxation, yet, my brain is deﬁnitely in a conscious state.
4. Questions for the Time-Bin Model
Speciﬁc questions regarding some of the implications of the
time-bin model include the following.
(1) How does a conscious state arise from statistical
supra-threshold activation of its temporal signature?
(2) How precise would such a signature be?
(3) Would it account for the generation of diﬀerent
levels of the conscious state in brains with diﬀerent
anatomical structures (brains of animals, Martians,
robots)?
( 4 )H o wd o e st h eb i o p h y s i c a lt i m e - b i nc o d er e l a t et o
variations in the subjectively experienced duration of
a conscious state or psychological moment?
4.1. From the First Tune to a Conscious Experience in
the Concert Hall. From the early days of our existence
when nothing we see, feel, or do is conscious, visual,
auditory, tactile, and other sensory input from multiple
sources is steadily processed and progressively integrated
into more and more stable memory representations through
the extraordinary capacity of nonconscious brain processes.
These representations progressively ﬁll the steadily up-dated
database that forms our long-term memory, from the ﬁrst
time we see a face or hear a tune to the moment we start
recognizing tunes, pieces of music, and faces and names
of performers. At some stage in this process, when there
is enough resonant circuitry extending across longer and
longer distances in the brain, allowing the increasingly non-
arbitrary linkage between conscious states and temporal
signatures capable of triggering them through coincidence
statistics that have become robust enough, a greater and
greater variety of non-consciously integrated representations
will become available to a larger and larger variety of
complex conscious experiences. When we sit in a concert
hall and listen to a symphony by Brahms, we will experience
successive mental events during which certain aspects of
the symphony, the visual scene, or the person sitting next
to us are selectively and momentarily made available to a
conscious state. What is selected will depend on how many
coinciding non-conscious memory representations of the
sssprevious conscious states will produce activities above the
threshold in the dedicated long-distance resonant circuits
which generate their temporal signatures. Other brain mech-
anisms, such as top-down ampliﬁcation or volition ([9, 31]),
may or may not be involved in this process.
When a conscious state is triggered, we become for a
short moment able to take stock of past events and to project
events into the future. This ability reﬂects the time-ordering
function of consciousness. It allows humans to plan and to
readsenseintotheirlives.Sometimeswhenweareconscious,
we may be under the impression that what we experience
looks or feels new, although we have seen or felt the same
many times before. Conversely, when we ﬁnd ourselves in
a new situation, a conscious experience may leave us with
the feeling that we have “been there before”, or that “this
hashappenedbefore.”Suchimpressionsarereadilyexplained
by the statistical nature of the temporal code proposed
here.
4.2. Apparent Novelty and “d´ ej` av u ” . Subjective impressions
of novelty or “d´ ej` a vu” would result from the fact that the
temporal signatures of conscious states represent a code
that is based on a purely temporal statistical likelihood. In
such a code, identical signatures are not linked to identical
conscious experiences. A brain hypothesis for a physical
e v e n ta ta n yg i v e nm o m e n ti nt i m ec a n n o tb em o r et h a nt h e
brain’s “best guess,” and biophysical brain events that remain
identical across time do not necessarily produce identical
conscious experiences across time. Conversely, conscious
states with diﬀerent temporal signatures may well produce a
subjectiveexperienceof“d´ ej` avu.”Abrainc odeforc onscious
states does not have to be perfectly accurate, only suﬃciently
robust against major ﬂuctuations and errors. This idea of anNeural Plasticity 11
approximate brain code is consistent with the hypothesis of
a multiple realizability of conscious states.
4.3. Multiple Realizability of Conscious States. Rather than
assuming that there would be a unique physiological state of
the brain for every unique mental state, philosophers such
as Lewis (e.g., [137]) have argued that the idea of diﬀerent
physiological or physical life-forms being in a same mental
state without being in the same physiological or physical
state would be a far more plausible hypothesis. The latter
has been termed “hypothesis of a multiple realizability of
mental states.” Brains with diﬀerent levels of physiological
development and spatial functional topology or architecture
should be able to generate temporal signatures producing
equivalent, though not necessarily identical, conscious states
in diﬀerent species. This should be possible through long-
distance temporal resonance in neural networks with very
diﬀerentintrinsictopologiesandcouldbebasedonstatistical
activity thresholds far less robust than those established
on the grounds of brain data reﬂecting the amount and
complexity of human lifelong development. What kind
of qualitative experience or qualia such conscious states
would enable remains completely uncertain. Our conscious
brain somehow becomes connected with the physical world
in the course of development, through a discrete process
which enables it to function in a statistically reliable way.
Sometimes, this process goes wrong, as in pathological brain
development producing dysfunctional conscious states.
4.4. The Conscious Brain and Psychological Time. In a way
similar to that of sonar systems which connect to the
outside by acquiring some form of knowledge of the physical
environment, conscious states appear to be encoded in our
brains in terms of temporal base frequencies, as through
scanning or pulsing. Although a conscious state may be
experienced in any form of psychological space-time, the
associated biophysical periods in the brain “scale” such
experience through a completely self-suﬃcient code. This
explains how the inner clocks of consciousness can operate
independently from spatial, verbal, or any other form of
cognitive or emotional experience. The brain is thus able
to detach itself from the subjective nature of conscious
experience, from what may seem “exciting” or “boring” to
us, with time “ﬂying by” or “standing still.” While we are in
a conscious state, imprisoned by all sorts of mental events
we may be experiencing, or completely freed from such
experience as in fully conscious deep meditation, the brain
is scaling signals related to these temporary events, in its own
biophysical time (see Figure 3).
5. Conclusions
The abstract model of conscious state generation proposed
hereaddressesthemind-bodyproblembysuggestingthatthe
conscious brain state is a dynamic result of progressive life-
long brain development. The conscious state code emerging
from such development is of a purely temporal and statistical
nature.
Some time ago, Nagel [138] insisted that in order to
understand the hypothesis that a mental event is a physical
event, we require more than the understanding of the word
“is”. His comment directly relates to identity theory (e.g.,
[139, 140]), a class of mind-body theories which reject
dualism by considering two possibilities, or hypotheses, of
identity between a mental state and a physiological state. The
ﬁrst is type identity, where mental states themselves would
be physical states. The second is token identity, where mental
states would be the direct reﬂection of a physiological or
physical state. Our model assumptions do not sustain the
identity claim. They address a fundamental problem recently
discussed by Block [10]. Since phenomenal consciousness
exceeds conscious cognitive activities such as perception or
memory recall, a ﬁrst step towards the abstract solution
a r g u e df o rb yB l o c ki st oo ﬀer a theory that dissociates
the brain origins of cognitive performance taking place
within consciousness from the brain genesis of the conscious
state as such. The idea of an abstract temporal signature
for conscious states achieves this by explaining how a
conscious state arises from higher-order temporal resonance
dynamics that are independent of sensory processing and
perception.
Thus, as Nagel [138] suggested, we go indeed beyond
the word “is” when we address the mind-body problem in
terms of an abstract biophysical code, which is diﬃcult to
reconcile with theories invoking “type” or “token” identity
betweenmindandbrain.Wenonethelessdefendarigorously
monist view by suggesting that dynamic links between
conscious states and physiological states form on the basis
of highly plastic brain activities governed by probabilistic
principles.
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